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Abstract 
Digital signature plays a key role in bringing authenticity to cryptographic communications. A signature scheme 
with message recovery has two characteristics. The public key of the signer can be authenticated while verifying 
the signature; and the receiver is able to obtain the message. In 2013, Wu and Xu presented a self-certified 
digital signature scheme with message recovery by combining the two concepts of digital signature with 
message recovery and self-certified public key. They also claimed that their scheme provides provable security 
against man-in-the-middle attack, forgery attack, and message leakage. This paper first reviews the scheme of 
Wu and Xu, and then presents an insider forgery attack to this scheme. It will be shown that this scheme is not 
secure against insider forgery attack. A modification is proposed in order to overcome this weakness. 
Keywords: Authenticated encryption; Digital signature; Message recovery; Self-certified public key. 
1. Introduction  
In cryptographic cryptosystems, digital signature is of paramount importance. It can provide integrity, 
authenticity, and non-repudiation. In public key cryptosystems, the integrity of the public keys must be kept. In 
classical digital signature schemes, the system authority 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 is used to bind users to their own public keys. 
However, the management of the certificates of public keys costs a lot. In 1991, Girault [1] introduced the 
notion of self-certified public key cryptosystem. In his scheme, the features of discrete logarithm problem and 
factoring problem are combined.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Each user is able to choose his own private key, and the user’s public key is derived from user’s identity and his 
own private key. In this kind of cryptosystem, the user’s public key is generated by 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 whereas his private key 
is only known by user himself. The user’s public key and identity can be verified implicitly in self-certified 
public key cryptosystems. 
In 1994, Neyberg and Ruppel [2] introduced a novel digital signature scheme that provides the property of 
message recovery based on discrete logarithm problem. Later, at the same year, Horster and his colleagues [3] 
proposed a modification of the scheme of Neyberg and Ruppel and called it authenticated encryption scheme. 
Based on Horster and his colleagues’ scheme, in 2003, Tseng and his colleagues [4] designed an authenticated 
encryption scheme. They also introduced two variants of their scheme. In 2004, Shao [5] demonstrated that their 
scheme is insecure against insider forgery attack, and proposed an improvement of their scheme. However, 
Chen and Jan [6] showed that the scheme of Shao is still not secure against insider forgery attack. In 2005, 
Chang and his colleagues [7] proved that the scheme of Tseng and his colleagues cannot resist 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺’s forgery 
attack. They also designed an improvement to overcome this flaw. However, in 2006, Yoon and Yoo [8] showed 
that their proposed improvement is vulnerable to known plaintext-ciphertext attack. In their paper, they 
introduced a new signature scheme which could resist the known plaintext-ciphertext attack.  In 2013, Wu and 
Xu [9] pointed out that the scheme of Yoon and his colleague is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack. They 
also proposed a new self-certified digital signature scheme with message recovery, and provided its provable 
security in eight aspects. 
In this paper, it will be demonstrated that the scheme of Wu and Xu is vulnerable to insider forgery attack, and 
the specified verifier is able to forge the signature if another verifier fully collaborates with him, in terms of 
providing the specified receiver with his own private key. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 is the review of the scheme of Wu and Xu. In section 3, it will be shown that this scheme is insecure against 
insider forgery attack. Section 4 is the modification of the scheme of Wu ad Xu. Finally, the conclusion is given 
in section 5. 
2. The scheme of Wu and Xu 
This scheme consists of four phases: system initialization phase, signature generation phase, message recovery 
phase, and signature conversion phase. The process of the signature is given in Figure 1. 
2.1. System initialization phase 
In the system initialization phase, there exists a system authority (𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺) that is responsible for generating system 
parameters. 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 first chooses two large primes 𝒑𝒑  and  𝒒𝒒  of almost the same size such that 𝒑𝒑 = 𝟐𝟐𝒑𝒑′ + 𝟏𝟏 and 
𝒒𝒒 = 𝟐𝟐𝒒𝒒′ + 𝟏𝟏, where 𝐩𝐩′ and 𝒒𝒒′ are also primes. Then, he computes 𝑵𝑵 = 𝒑𝒑.𝒒𝒒. Afterwards, he chooses an integer 
𝒈𝒈 which is a base element of order 𝒑𝒑’.𝒒𝒒’. 
The system authority keeps 𝒑𝒑,𝒒𝒒,𝒑𝒑’ and 𝒒𝒒’  secret and publishes 𝒈𝒈,𝒏𝒏, the group ℤ𝒏𝒏∗ , and four collision free one-
way hash functions as follows: 
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𝑭𝑭,𝑯𝑯: {𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏}∗            �⎯�  {𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏}𝒌𝒌 
𝑭𝑭𝟏𝟏: {𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏}∗            �⎯�  {𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏}𝒍𝒍𝟏𝟏  
𝑭𝑭𝟐𝟐: {𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏}∗            �⎯�  {𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏}𝒍𝒍𝟐𝟐  
Where 𝒍𝒍𝑵𝑵 is of the length of 𝑵𝑵 in binary, and 𝒍𝒍𝑵𝑵 = 𝒍𝒍𝟏𝟏 + 𝒍𝒍𝟐𝟐. The scheme can deal with 𝑴𝑴 ∈ {𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏}𝒍𝒍𝟐𝟐. 
In this scheme, 𝒌𝒌 = ⌈𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝑷𝑷)⌉,and 𝑷𝑷 = 𝐦𝐦𝐦𝐦𝐦𝐦(𝒑𝒑′,𝒒𝒒′). 
When the user 𝑼𝑼𝒊𝒊  wants to join the system, he chooses his private key 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊  at random and computes 𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊 = 𝒈𝒈𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊  𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒏𝒏.  Then, he submits (𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊, 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒊) to the 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺. After receiving (𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊, 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒊), the system authority computes 
𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊 = (𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊 − 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒊)𝑭𝑭(𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒊)−𝟏𝟏𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 𝒏𝒏, and publishes 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊. The user 𝑼𝑼𝒊𝒊 can easily check the validity of 𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊. 
2.2. Signature generation phase 
When 𝑼𝑼𝒊𝒊 decides to sign a message 𝑴𝑴 with the length 𝒌𝒌 to the verifier 𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋, he chooses a number 𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊 at random 
and computes the following variables: 
𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊 = 𝒈𝒈𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊   𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 𝒏𝒏 
𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊 = (𝒚𝒚𝒋𝒋𝑭𝑭�𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒋𝒋� + 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒋𝒋)𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊   𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 𝒏𝒏 
𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊 = 𝑭𝑭𝟏𝟏(𝑴𝑴) ∥ 𝑭𝑭𝟐𝟐�𝑭𝑭𝟏𝟏(𝑴𝑴)�⨁𝑴𝑴 
𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊 = 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊 ⊕ 𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊 
𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊 = 𝑯𝑯(𝑴𝑴, 𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊) 
𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒊 = 𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊 − 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊. 𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊.𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊 
Where “⨁” denotes the exclusive-or operator, and “∥” denotes the concatenation operator. 
At last, 𝑼𝑼𝒊𝒊 sends (𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊, 𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒊,𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊) to 𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋 as the signature of 𝑴𝑴. 
2.3. Message recovery phase 
After receiving (𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊, 𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒊,𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊), the verifier 𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋 computes 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊 = 𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊𝒙𝒙𝒋𝒋  𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 𝒏𝒏, and calculates 𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊 = 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊⨁𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊. 
Then, he can achieve the message 𝑴𝑴 by the following equation 
𝑴𝑴 = 𝑭𝑭𝟐𝟐([𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊]𝒍𝒍𝟏𝟏)⨁[𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊]𝒍𝒍𝟐𝟐 
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where [𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊]𝒍𝒍𝟏𝟏 is the left 𝒍𝒍𝟏𝟏 bits of 𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊, and [𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊]𝒍𝒍𝟐𝟐  is the right 𝒍𝒍𝟐𝟐 bits of 𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊. 
In order to check the validity of the signature, 𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋  first computes 𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊 = 𝑯𝑯(𝑴𝑴, 𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊) and then, he checks whether the 
following equation holds or not. 
𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊 = 𝒈𝒈𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒊(𝒚𝒚𝒊𝒊𝑭𝑭(𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒊) + 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒊)𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊 𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 𝒏𝒏 
If the above equation holds, he accepts the signature as a valid signature for 𝑴𝑴. Otherwise, he rejects the 
signature. 
2.4. Signature conversation phase 
𝑼𝑼𝒋𝒋 can publish (𝑴𝑴, 𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊, 𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊), and anyone can confirm the validity of the signature by the following equation: 
𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊 = 𝑯𝑯(𝑴𝑴, 𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊) 
phase 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 
System 
initialization 
phase 
 
 
 
 
 
Computes 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝐹𝐹(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖)−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 
, and publicize 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 . 
Chooses 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 randomly and 
computes 
 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛.  
Submits  (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)  to the 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. 
 
Signature 
generation 
phase 
 Computes 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 =
𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛, 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖= (𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗�+  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗)𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛, 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝐹𝐹1(𝑀𝑀)
∥ 𝐹𝐹2�𝐹𝐹1(𝑀𝑀)�⨁𝑀𝑀 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 . 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 sends (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) to 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 
 
Message 
recovery 
phase 
  Calculates 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 =
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛, 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖⨁𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , and obtains 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝐹𝐹2([𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑙𝑙1)⨁[𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑙𝑙2 . 
Computes 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖). 
Then, checks whether 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖= 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖)+ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 
 
Figure 1: Scheme of Wu and Xu 
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3. Insider forgery attack to scheme of Wu and Xu 
In this section, an insider forgery attack to the aforementioned scheme will be presented. In the insider forgery 
attack, the specified receiver 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 forges the received signature of a given message for other system users. The 
other user is denoted by 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂. If 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂is willing to provide 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 with his secret key 𝑥𝑥𝑜𝑜, then 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 is able to forge a valid 
signature for him. This cooperation between 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂 and 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 makes sense in many cases of applications of digital 
signature scheme with message recovery, e.g. in electronic election or in electronic commerce. As an instance, 
consider that 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 and 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂 are two friends who want to purchase e-tickets for some mp3 files. They decide to buy 
just one e-ticket and forge another e-ticket cooperatively. Thus, 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 buys the ticket (which is 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖′𝑠𝑠 signature with 
message recovery) and offers 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂 a forged e-ticket. If 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂 trusts 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗, he might reveal his secret key to 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 in order 
to obtain a forged e-ticket.  
Follows demonstrate how this forgery attack operates. 
Assume that 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  has recovered 𝑀𝑀  from the signature (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) signed by 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  . He wants to forge a signature (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖) of 𝑀𝑀 for 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂. The claim is that (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖) is a valid signature of 𝑀𝑀 signed by 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 for 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂. 
First, 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂  reveals his own private key 𝑥𝑥𝑜𝑜 to 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 . Thereafter, 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  performs the following steps to forge a valid 
signature: 
1) Compute 𝑅𝑅′𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥0 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛. 
2) Compute 𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅′𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖. ( 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 has obtained 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 in the message recovery phase.) 
3) Send the forged signature (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖) to 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂. 
The signature (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖) can be verified easily since 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝐹𝐹2([𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑙𝑙1)⨁[𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑙𝑙2  
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) 
, and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛, therefore; 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂  can claim that (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖) is the signature of 𝑀𝑀 signed 
by 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 for him. 
In case of any disputes over the validity of the signature, 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂  publishes  (𝑀𝑀, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖), to satisfy whomever questions 
the validity of (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖). 
The reason of vulnerability of Wu and Xu’s scheme to this attack is that the verification equations  𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 =
𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖), and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 cannot detect the change in the amount of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  which is replaced 
by 𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖  in the forged signature. 
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The process of the attack is illustrated in Figure 2. 
phase  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖   𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂 
Signature 
generation 
phase 
Computes 
 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛, 
and 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = (𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗� +  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗)𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 
, and 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝐹𝐹1(𝑀𝑀) ∥ 𝐹𝐹2�𝐹𝐹1(𝑀𝑀)�⨁𝑀𝑀, 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖, 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖), and 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖. 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖
(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖)
�⎯⎯⎯⎯� 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 
  
Message 
recovery 
phase 
 Calculates 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛, 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖⨁𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , and obtains 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝐹𝐹2([𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑙𝑙1)⨁[𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑙𝑙2 . 
Computes 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖). 
Then, checks whether 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 
 
 
Insider 
forgery 
attack 
  
 
 
Computes  
𝑅𝑅′𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥0  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 
, 𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅′𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 
forges the signature and 
  𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗  (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖)�⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯� 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂 
 
Chooses 𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂 as his secret 
key 
𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗
          𝑥𝑥𝑂𝑂  
�⎯⎯⎯⎯� 𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂 
 
 
 
 
Claims that  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖  signed (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖) for him. 
Figure 2: Insider forgery attack to the scheme of Wu and Xu 
 
4. Modification of Wu and Xu’s self-certified digital signature scheme with message recovery 
This section represents a slight modification to overcome the security flaw in the scheme of Wu and Xu. 
Given the fact that the reason of insecurity of Wu and Xu’s scheme against insider forgery attack is that the 
verification equation cannot find the change in 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , it is sufficed to make a slight change in the equation 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 =
𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖). With changing 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) to 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀∗, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) where 𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝑀𝑀 ∥ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , the insider forgery attack is not 
successful against the modified scheme because any changes in term of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  would cause changes in the amount of 
𝑀𝑀∗ and 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖. The modified scheme has also four phases: system initialization phase, signature generation phase, 
message recovery phase, and dispute arbitration phase. The modified scheme is represented in Figure 3. 
4.1. System initialization phase 
This phase is exactly the same as system initialization phase in Wu and Xu’s scheme. 
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4.2. signature generation phase 
When 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 wants to sign a message 𝑀𝑀 with the length 𝑘𝑘 to the verifier 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗, he chooses a number 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  randomly and 
calculates the following variables: 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖   𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = (𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗� + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗)𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖   𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝐹𝐹1(𝑀𝑀) ∥ 𝐹𝐹2�𝐹𝐹1(𝑀𝑀)�⨁𝑀𝑀 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 
𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝑀𝑀 ∥ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀∗, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 . 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 
Where “⨁” denotes the exclusive-or operator, and “∥” denotes the concatenation operator. 
Then, 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 sends (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) to 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 as the signature of 𝑀𝑀. 
4.3. Message recovery phase 
Upon receiving (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖), the verifier 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 computes 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 ,and  𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖⨁𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 . Then, he can achieve the 
message 𝑀𝑀 = 𝐹𝐹2([𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑙𝑙1)⨁[𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑙𝑙2 , where [𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑙𝑙1  is the left 𝑙𝑙1 bits of 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖, and [𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑙𝑙2  is the right 𝑙𝑙2 bits of 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖. In order to 
check the validity of the signature, 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 first computes 𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝑀𝑀 ∥ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , and  
 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀∗, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖). Then, he checks whether the following equation holds or not. 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 
If the above equation holds, he accepts the signature as a valid signature for 𝑀𝑀. Otherwise, he rejects the 
signature. If the signature is valid and signed by 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖, then the above equation must hold because 
𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 .𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖−𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 , and as mentioned in signature 
generation phase 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛. 
4.4. Dispute arbitration phase 
In case of any dispute over the validity of the signature, 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 can publish (𝑀𝑀, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖), and anyone can confirm the 
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validity of the signature by the following equation: 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀∗, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) 
phase 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 
System 
initialization 
phase 
 
 
 
Computes 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 =(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝐹𝐹(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖)−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 
, and publicize 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 . 
Chooses 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 randomly and 
computes 
 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛.  
Submits (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) to the 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. 
 
Signature 
generation 
phase 
 Computes 
 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛, 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖= (𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝐹𝐹�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗�+  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗)𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛, 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝐹𝐹1(𝑀𝑀) ∥
𝐹𝐹2�𝐹𝐹1(𝑀𝑀)�⨁𝑀𝑀, 
and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ⊕ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 
Then, Computes 
𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝑀𝑀 ∥ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀∗, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖. 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 sends (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) to 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 
 
 
Message 
recovery 
phase 
  Calculates 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛, 
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖⨁𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , and obtains 
𝑀𝑀 = 𝐹𝐹2([𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑙𝑙1)⨁[𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖]𝑙𝑙2 . 
Computes 𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝑀𝑀 ∥ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 
 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀∗, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖). 
Then, checks whether 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖= 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑛𝑛 
Figure 3: Modification of an improved self-certified digital signature scheme with message recovery 
5. Conclusion 
In the present paper an improved self-certified digital signature scheme with message recovery is reviewed. A 
security analysis for the scheme is presented by proposing an insider forgery attack against this scheme, and it is 
demonstrated that this scheme cannot withstand the attack. It is also argued that in modern electronic 
environments, the aforementioned attack can cause negative consequences, particularly in electronic commerce 
and electronic voting systems. A slight improvement for the scheme is suggested in order to remove the 
weakness. The propose modification is secure against insider forgery attack. 
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